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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
\ 
WAYNE c. CLOSE, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD G. BLUMENTHAL and 
VIRGINIA A. BLUMENTHAL, 
Defendants and AppeHants. 
CASE 
NO. 9196 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, 
and Brief in Support Thereof 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing 
Respondent, Wayne C. Close, petitions tJhe Oourrt fur 
a rehearing in this case upon the ~ounds hereinafiteT set 
forth. 
In support of said Petition, respondent relies upon the 
following points: 
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT 
THJE SELLER ON A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
LAND HAD TO RETURN THE PAYMENT MADE OR 
BE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING AN ACITON FOR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
POINT ll 
THIS COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DISREGARDED 
THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS JURISDICTION 
IN REACHING THE RESULT THAT IT DID. 
POINT ill 
THIS COURT ERREID IN ASSUMING THAT THE 
BUYER WAS INDUCED TO SIGN THlE CONTRACT 
SUED UPON UPON THE REPRESENTATION THAT 
THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED WOULD BE THE EXTENT 
OF HIS LIABILITY. 
WHIEREFORE, respondent prays that his petition for 
rehearing be g:ranrted and that upon such rehearing, and 
after oonsideration of fue re·oord, and the law, the decision 
of the oowt be recalled, and the District Corurt's decision 
affimled. 
Dallas H. Young, Jr., for 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT EJRRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT 
TH!E SELLER ON A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
LAND HAD TO RETURN THE PAY,MENT MADE OR 
BE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION FOR 
SPOCIFIC PERFDRMANCE. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DISREGARDED 
THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS JURISDlCTION 
IN REACHING THE RESULT THAT IT DID. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT ERRED· IN ASSUMING THAT THE 
BUYER WAS INDUCED TO SIGN THlE CONTRACT 
SUED UPON UPON THE REPRESENTATION THAT 
THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED WOULD BE THE EXTENT 
OF HIS LIABILITY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT EJRRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT 
THJE SELLER ON A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
LA-ND HAD TO RETURN THE PAYMENT MAiDE OR 
BE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION FOR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The court's decision is again:st the esta;blished law of 
the Sta:te m Utah and against the "almost unanimous" rule 
of the jurisdictions of this country. The Supreme C01urt 
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of the United States has ruled rto rthe contmry. Stewart Vs. 
Griffith, 217 U. S. 323, 54 L. ed. 782, 30 Sup. Ot. Rep. 528, 
19 Ann. Oas. 639. So have almost all of the coll.ll"ts of this 
country. Rogers Vs. Dorrance, 140 Md. 419, 117 Atl. 564, 
32 ALR 573. 
The following states have adopted a rule which is ex-
actly opposite to the rule annorunced by this court in this 
case: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connooti-
cut, ~laware, Idaho, illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Dou.isiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, RJhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, and Washington. 
There are sorund reaso!lls why these jurisdictions have 
adopted rthe rule. They are corvrect. This court is wrong 
in its announced rule. Plaintiff cannot find one case out-
side this jurisdiction to support the oourt's ruling. 
The cases which support the reasoning of the courts 
of the above jurisdictions are set out in annotati01l1S found 
in 32 ALR 584, and 98 ALR 887. 
In nearly all those cases decided by the courts of the 
above states, the contracts were less favorable ·to the seller 
than in this oase. In almost every one of those contracts, 
the contract expressly provided that in the event of breach, 
the money paid would be forfeited. No option was given 
the sellers. The contract provisions pro~ded expressly 
that the payments would be forfeited as damages. Yet the 
oourts unijjorml.y hold that such contract prOvisions do not 
preclude an action for specific perfunnance. 
One of the principal reasons for reaching this result 
is that the ooorts conclude that _contracts should be per-
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formed not breached. Unless the contrary appears, the 
courts unanimously assume that the deposit is made to in-
sure performance, not to entitle the buyoc rto viotlate the 
contJraot. 32 ALR 585 at 588. 
"The question is whether the sum promded to be for-
feited as 'liquidated damages' was intended as security 
~or the performance of the contract, o~ whether the 
clause is to be construed as an option by which, at the 
election of the purchaser, he could pay the purchase 
money and take the land, or refuse 1Jo take the land 
and lose the money which had been paid. The fact that 
the sum is stated to be 'liquidated damages' is imma-
terial, unless ,the contract is 1Jo be ccmstrued as an op-
Uon, and the forleiture of the sum named sUJbstituted 
thr the payment of the purchase money, at the pur-
chaser's election." Don~hoe Vs. Franks (1912) 199 
Fed. 262, Supra. 
"When rtJhe penalty appears ifJo be intended merely as a 
security ~or the perfbrmance of the agreement, the 
principal object of the parties will be carried out." 
Dooley Vs. Watsoo, (1854) 1 Gray (Mass.) 414. 
"It was competent ~or the parti·es to make an ·alternative 
agreement by which the purchasers are given the right 
to complete the purchase or to pay a stipulated amount 
of money by way of damages in place of perlormance, 
and, where that is the agreement, specifiJc perfunnance 
of the contract will not be decreed. The question in 
every case of ifhis kind is whether the provision :for the 
forfeiture of a prescribed amount is made 1io secure 
performance or as a substitute fo[' performance. If 
the stipulation shows that it was a mere penalty to se-
cure compliance with the conditions orf the oonrtract, a 
court will enfo['ce it, but, if it shO!Ws that it was alter-
native in character, giving ·the party the option to per-
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form or pay a stipulaJted amount in lieu thereof, spe-
cific perfmmance will ibe denied.'' Knisely vs. Robin-
son (1922) 111 Kan. 300, 206 Bac. 877. 
This court gave the provision ih question an interpre-
tation exac1Jly opposite to the one given by all o.f the courts 
of other jurisdictions. 
The insertion of the option oo the part of the seller 
should strengthen not reduce the seller's rights. Yet vhis 
court penalizes the seller because he has the expressed op-
tion to require performance or retain the money paid as 
damages. 
Few of the contract provisioos contained in the cases 
cited in the 32 ALR 584 and 98 ALR 887 ann01tJations pro-
vided alternative 10ourses of action for the seller. Nearly 
all of fue cases provided that the payments made would be 
forfeited as liquidated damages. The courts hold almost 
unanimously ,that even though the contracts say that rthe 
amoUlllt paid will be retained as liquidated damages, still 
the seller has an option. The option is to accept the amount 
paid or erl]o~ce the contract. Some o.f the contract prmi-
sions 'Cited in 32 ALR 584 are as follows: 
". . . if the purchaser fails to perform, the earnest 
money 'shall, at the option orf the vendor and his agents, 
be furleited as liquidated damages,' and this contract 
shall beoome null and void. Egle Vs. Morrison, (1904) 
27 Ohio C. C. 497; 
''. . . if either party fails to perlorm, he shall forfeit to 
the other party $500 as 'liquidated damages.' Kettering 
Vs. Eastlack (1906) 130 Iowa 498, 107 N. W. 177, 8 
Ann. Oas. 357; 
". . . if the vendee fails to comply with the contract, 
the $100 paid by him shall-be 'forfeited by him and 
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retained by said vendor as liquidated damages for its 
breach.' Ochs Vs. Kramer (1908) 32 Ky. L. Rep. 762, 
107 S. W. 2~60. (The court said that it did not think 
the contract an alternative one·; that rthe clause in re-
spect 1Jo the fur:feittrre of the $100 was evidently in-
serted by way of penalty, and with the object of se-
curing full performance of the contract, and not wi1th 
the view that the payment should oonstitute a per-
formance of ·the contract ~and theTeby op&ate as a dis-
charge thereof) ; 
". . . in ICase of forfeiture by purchaser for failure to 
, make stipulated payments, the vendor may retain im-
provements and one-half of ·the purohase money and 
all interest from the tax:es and expenses of insurance 
paid thereon, 'as liquidated damages' for the breach 
of the CO!lltract and foc rent of the premises, there be-
ing an express provision thaJt the vendor might waive 
the forfeiture. Steel Vs. Long (1897) 104 lowa 38, 
73 N. W. 470 (arguendo); 
'" ... in oase of default by the purchaser, the initial 
payment or deposit orf $1,000 shall be forleited as 'liqtrl.-
dated damag·es.' Rittenhouse Vs. Swiecicki (1922) 
__ N .. J: Eq. , 118 Atl. 261; 
". . . if the purchaser fiails to make the payment when 
due, he shall forleit ·all righrts undeT the contraot, ~and 
all payments theretofore made slhall be retained by the 
vendor as 'liquidated damages.' First Trust & Sav. 
Bank Vs. Pruitt (1922) 121 S. C. 484, 113 S. W. 469; 
First Trust & Sav. Bank Vs. Spratt (1922) S.. C. 
---· 113 S. E. 473; 
". . . five hundred dollars paid in cash to bind the bar-
gain to be forfeited if vendee makes default. Waddill 
Vs. Sa:bree (1892) 88 Va." 1012, 29 Am. St. Rep. 766, 
14 S. E. 849; 
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". . . in ease either party fails to pocform the stipula-
ticms of the contract, oc any part of the same, he shall 
pay the other the sum of $1,000 as 'damages for IlO!Il-
fulfilment of the contract.' O'Brien Vs. Paulsen (1922) 
192 I01wa 1351, 186 N. W. 440 (arguendo)." 
None of cthe ooll.lrts of the states listed above required 
the retmn of the money paid as a oondition to enforce the 
con :tract. 
Such a requirement ~ not realistic. The amount paid 
by rthe buyer ma.y or may not be in the possession Off tlle 
seller. Sometimes sellers have obligations to meet. Some-
times disputes arise between sellers and their agents. See 
31 ALR 2d 8 where oases involving litigation between sellers 
and brokers respecting earnest money payments are re-
ported. The time for perlormance varies. In this case the 
time for perf<ormance was 32 days after the payment. Oft 
times the time for perlormance extends over a period of 
years. 
POINT IT 
THIS COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DISREGARDED 
THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS JURISDICTION 
IN REACHING THE RESULT THAT IT DID. 
This court has given a vecy similar contract provision 
a oomtruction exactly opposite to the one given in this 
case. In the case of Soter .Vls. Snyder, 277 P2d 966, the 
appellant made substantially the same argument as the 
appellant made here. 
In rthat case, the seller had sold personal property on 
a oonditiooal sales contract. Part of that case reads as 
follows: 
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"Appellants contend that such judgment was contrary 
to the law and the agreement of the parties because 
by providing that the seller may at his option declare 
the entire sum due and owing upon the purchasers' de-
faulting in any of the payments when due or within 
30 days thereafter, and upon such failure of the pur-
chasers, the sellers could retake possession of said prop-
e11ty and could re1Jain any payments as liquidated dam-
ages, respondent thereby expressly agreed that his only 
remedy for breach of this contract should be repos-
se:.::sion. We cannot agree with this argument. UndeT 
their agreement, the purchasers specifically agreed to 
pay a certain sum for the property involved, the bal-
ance of which was to be paid in installments until the 
total purchase price was paid. It was further agreed 
that the 'title of the property herein conditionally sold 
should remain in rthe seUer until all of the agreements 
of the purchasers shall have been perlormed and un-
til all payments aforesaid ito the selle'r have been fully 
paid, and upon full payment by the purchasers afiore--
said to the seller, title shall thereupon pass and be ves-
ted in purchasers.' It would be unreasonaJble to oon-
strue such a contract as meaning that the parties 
thereto intended that the seller could not, if he so de-
sired, insist upon 'being paid the purchase price, mere-
ly because he had an option to repossess the property. 
To so argue is to ignore the meaning of the word 'op-
tion.'" Soter Vs. Snyder, supra. 
There are other similarities between the Soter case 
and this case. According to the contract in this oase, pos-
session of the property was to be deliver·ed on April 28, 
1959, 33 days before the balance of the purchase price was 
due. Likewise possession of the goods sold had been deliv-
ered in the Soter case. The presumption is that the con-
tract was performed. 13 Covpus Juris 762, Contracts Sec-
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tion 9'53; 20 American Jurisprudence 222, Evidence Section 
227. So, presumwbly, the buy& was in possession. The 
oonrtJract p~rovided that interest would be charged from Ap-
ril 28, 1959. Under the contract as executed, the risk af 
destruction of the property fell upon tile buyeT after April 
28, 1959. The remaining balance due was the balance of 
the purchase price and yet in spite of all fuese things-de-
livery of possession, the agreement on the part of the buyer 
to pay interest on fue amount due under the agreement, the 
assumption of risk for damage to the property---still this 
oourrt under the present opinion precludes the seller from 
maintaining an action for specific performance. Either this 
case is wrong, or the Soter ease is wrong. Obviously, the 
OOUflt is in error in this case. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE 
BUYER WAS INDUCED TO SIGN THE CONTRACT 
SUED UPON UPON THE REPRESENTATION THAT 
THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED WOULD BE THE EXTENT 
OF HIS LIABILITY. 
No such facts were ever claimed by the defendants. 
The contract itself pr01virled for interest oo the balance of 
the purchase price. The contract provided that the risk 
of destruction of the property was upon the defendants after 
April 28, 1959 (R. 36). In making the assumptioo that 
it did, the court not ooly assumed facts not in the record, 
it ignored the facts whi:ch are in the record to the contrary. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully 'submits that :the court erred 
m reaching the conclusion that it did reach. Under the 
oourt's ruliJng, Utah will represent a minority view of this 
rule of law and it will be the single state representing that 
minority view. This case changes the law of the State of 
Utah from a sound 1Jo an unsound e<mdition. This case 
should be re-argued and the judgment of the District COurt 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dallas H. Young, Jr., for 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
227 North Unive~si:ty Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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